

The Great October Elections in Liberia 2005: The Doctrine of Free and Fair Elections are not pre-conditions for Democracy : A Case Study of Post-Conflict Resolution, Democratic Presidential Leadership for Reconciliation, Rehabilitation, Reconstruction, Recovery, and Women Empowerment for the Redemption of Liberia

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Abstract:

The years 1990, 2000, 2001` and 2003 were particularly hard for former dictators of the world, this includes Africa, specifically Liberia. For instance, the former president of Yugoslavia, Slobodan Milosevic, arrested months earlier by Serbian authorities, was put on trial at the United Nations International War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague (Netherlands). The father of Serbia genocidal war against Bosnia and its attacks on the Serbian province of Kosovo, Milosevic became the first and only European Eastern Bloc nation head of government since World War II to face charges of human rights violations before an international court. Haiti, J. Bertrand Aristeed was alleged to have been democratically elected and he was supported by the United States government, under Bush-I and Clinton Administrations. Under Bush-II, Aristeed was forced to seek exile in an unknown Central African Nation. Samuel K. Doe of Liberia, who was supported by the Ronald Reagan Administration having robbed the 1985 Elections and was declared as democratically elected. Doe was one of the causes of the demise and abuse of post independence Africa's Democratic civilization in generally and Liberia in particular. Charles Taylor, a rebel once again forced the 1987 Liberian elections, President Jimmy Carter and others advocated that Charles Taylor was a democratically elected President of Liberia. The Liberian people once again returned to tyranny under Taylor until 2003, when President Bush-2 once again forced Taylor in exile in Nigeria. These events capped nearly three decades of transitions from authoritarian to democratic government throughout the world. Post-Charles Taylor Liberia's Conflict Management and Resolution Dimensions must redefine "Democracy" from the 21<sup>st</sup> century perspective to reflect The Great October Elections in Liberia 2005.

Introduction:

As we see sweeping democratic changes around the world, the years 1990, 2000, 2001, and 2003, were particularly hard for former dictators of the world, including Liberia.

1. For instance, Slobodan Milosevic, the former President of Yugoslavia, was arrested months earlier by Serbian authorities and was put on trial at the United Nations International War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague, the (Netherlands). The father of Serbia, and his genocidal war and attacks against Bosnia and the Serbian province of Kosovo, Milosevic, the head of government, became the first and only European Eastern Bloc nation to face charges of human rights violations before an international court since World War II.
2. J. Bertrand Aristeed of Haiti was alleged to have been democratically elected and was supported by the United States government under the Bush-I, and Clinton Administrations. Under Bush-II, Aristeed was forced to seek exile in an unknown Central African Nation.
3. Charles Taylor, a former rebel leader of Liberia, is another failed African leader, who again forced his way into office after the 1997 Liberian Elections, under the watchful eyes of President Jimmy Carter and those who advocated that Taylor was a democratically elected President of Liberia. This forced the Liberian people into tyranny under the ruler ship of Taylor until 2003, at which time, President George W. Bush II, forced Taylor in exile in Nigeria.
4. Indeed, the late Samuel K. Doe of Liberia, was also supported by Ronald Reagan Administration, having robbed the 1985 Elections and was declared a democratically elected leader.

It must be articulated that we as scholars of Africa/Liberia in World Affairs must be aware that the doctrine of free and fair elections are not the pre-conditions for democratic leadership. Because a genuine democratically Elected Presidential leadership entails a building of a nation based on selflessness, an equitable dispensation of justice, equality, freedom, equal opportunity and the full participation of women and all, in the nations' affairs. In my opinion, some (if not all), democratic elected leaders, particularly the African leadership has failed to perform these democratic obligations thus subjecting the masses of the African people to further humiliation. Obviously, the demise and abuse of Africa's post independence and democratic process are attributable to the failure of many African leaders including Charles Taylor and Samuel K. Doe of Liberia.

It is saving to say that the concepts of Free and Fair Elections and democratically elected presidents in Africa in general and Liberia in particular, these events have capped decades of transitions from authoritarian rule to semi- democratically elected governments throughout the world. Of course, in the context of the doctrine of free and fair elections, a democratically elected president, based on our experiences as African scholars and Africa's political Historians, must not be viewed as a pre-condition for democracy. However, the post-Charles Taylor Great October Elections in Liberia must redefine "democracy" from the 21<sup>st</sup> Century perspective, so as to reflect on the "2005 Great October Elections in Liberia". This is absolutely essential based on the mere fact that as we look back to reflect our recollections, we see and remember the starving and hopeless faces and the emaciated bodies of our Liberian brothers and sisters, while the world sat back and watched. Case of the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda.

Justifying Authoritarian Leadership under the doctrine of Democratically Elected President and Free and Fair Elections: The Liberian Case Study (1985 &1997).

In the midst of democracy's current worldwide advance, it seems hard believe that not long ago, freely elected governments and flourishing civil societies were often seen as unattainable or even undesirable in many African nations. Modernization theorists frequently claimed the newly emerging states of Africa and Asia were not sufficiently developed, economically or socially, to sustainable political democracy.' And dependency theorists declared that democracy was unlikely to emerge in Liberia because powerful industrialized nations were allied with local political and economic elites to bolster unrepresentative government. Some scholars worried that levels of mass political participation were out stripping many African governments' capacities to accommodate society's political demands. Unless Third World political institutions could be strengthened, many African political and cultural observers warned, political unrest threatened to derail economic and political development. Given the dangers of social disorder, some analysts and Third World specifically African leaders used this argument to justify authoritarian rule as a necessary precondition for stopgap. Only with more advanced socioeconomic modernization, it seemed, could Post Conflict Liberia's Visionary Liberian Leadership produce citizens capable of effective political participation. Increased education and literacy will be seen as necessary to expand post conflict Liberian society's political knowledge and develop effective political participation. We now know that countries emerging from a protracted genocidal conflict like Liberia, are unlikely to establish stable, democratic government unless these nations

have risen above the bottom ranks of post conflict poverty (as expressed by GNP per capita) and have reached a literacy rate of at least 50 percent.”

In addition to raising literacy, modernization also enlarges the size of the middle class and the organized (unionized) working class, both of whom are essential factors of a more stable and inclusive democracy.”

But an obvious chicken-and-egg quandary presented itself. If socioeconomic modernization is necessary to establish post conflict Visionary Liberian Leadership and democracy, how can a democratic government be the agent of modernization in post 2005 Visionary Liberian Leadership? This presentation will attempt to provide some answers such as: (1) this couldn't; only be implemented by a strong and stable authoritarian government—such as General Augusto Pinochet's dictatorship in Chile or South Korea's various military governments in Africa. (2) Jump-start modernization can be produced by civilian transparency and decentralized government. Only later, when the country was ready, like Liberia's anticipated post 2005 visionary mission, should dictatorships, (i.e., Samuel K. Doe and Charles Taylor) give way to democracy.” However, other scholars noted another obstacle to democratic government in the developing world, specifically Liberia. They argued that many LDCs, held back by authoritarian traditional values, lacked a democratic political culture and that democracy would have to be preceded by modernization of social and culture values.” It must be mentioned that many Third World leaders insisted that not only would it be difficult to establish democracy in their countries, but that it was not even desirable at that periods of their development. In Africa, like Liberia, many first-generation, postcolonial leaders treated single-party systems, banning or restricting opposition political parties. These citizens argued that ethnic tensions in their country made competitive election risky because they would prompt different political parties to represent. Restrictions and ethnic biases of trading tribes or clans, further polarizing the country's democratic electrical process. Other leaders or governing nations were influenced by Marxist-Leninist ideology, more circular at that time than now. These African leaders maintained that poverty, tribalism, and dependency at home were so severe that an all-powerful state linked to a “Vanguard party” ‘one that knows what is in the best interests of the people) was needed to lead the country forward. Later, as many of these governments failed miserably; military dictators took their place, claiming that civilian rulers were too corrupt or too weak to govern effectively. In the Middle East, similar justifications were used for one-party or military rule. More recently, Islamic fundamentalist governments in Iran, Sudan, and Afghanistan have prohibited political opposition groups whom they regard as infidels. While many Latin American nations had democratic or semi democratic governments in the 1950s and early 1960s, during the two decades that followed, a series of military coups installed repressive governments in most of the region. These new authoritarian leaders often justified their rule.

Leadership as Factors in Sustainability or Prolongation of the Ideas of Democratic Capacity Building and Growth in Post 2005 Visionary Liberian Political Leadership .

*It becomes essential to address this serious subject by Applying variants of the Great Man Theory of History to the ideas of democratic policy reform in Post 2005 Visionary Liberian Political Leadership. An extreme variant of the view that Post Conflict Political*

Leadership is instrumental in improving policy and accelerating democratic and economic growth is the "Great Man Theory of History". In an African context, specifically Liberia from the post-conflict Charles Taylor political leadership, this would require the emergence of leaders who (a) are motivated to launch their countries onto an internationally acceptable democratic and economic growth path. (b) The leaders have the charisma and other qualities required to impose their political, social, economic, cultural, and development agenda in the face of vested interests and voter inertia. Yet, according to the Theory, such leaders emerge as random events over which the outside world, including the international financial institutions (IFIs) and others, can have little influence or manipulation on them. In its most simplistic form, the Theory asserts that the course of history (or at least major segments of it) is determined by the random appearance of charismatic leaders, who rally as much political support as they require from interest groups and a population at large to move the political, social, cultural, educational, Health and Safety, Security and Safety, and the natural resources and economy forward to the benefit of the nation and its people. Before adapting the Great Man theory to the question of policy reform and growth in Africa, specifically Liberia, it is helpful to (i) review alternative hypotheses about the factors underlying adoption and Nona option of democratic reforms leading to accelerated cultural growth, and then (ii) consider what role Great Men (or Women) have played in the Liberian political lives. Perhaps the most systematic effort to analyze the implementation of post conflict democratic policy reforms representative of Liberian consensus is their ultimate powers to put Liberia back on the map of modernization of democratic Institute for International Economic development.

Post- 2005 Liberian Presidential Leadership and *Political Economy of Policy Reform* from a 21<sup>st</sup> century perspective:

When do leaders merit the characterization "visionary"? According to my personal philosophy of visionary in the context of post-conflict Liberian political leadership, they must be judiciously executives and ethno-culturally conscious with strong commitment. A visionary Liberian Leadership must have a vision of where the leadership would like Liberia to go (even if this [is] not always combined with any clear sense of how to get there, and a willingness to take risks, but their must be a Liberian political leadership vision as a road map. The Politics of Cultural Pluralism and Ethnic Conflict has been post-Cold War Liberian conflicts dynamics. Because these conflicts seem to be a threat to future Africa's post Cold War democratic capacity building as a case of Liberia from 1980-2003. The 25-years Liberian civil conflict , in many instances, as confused, misdirected, unfocused, unspecific, and useless, the conflicts were more likely to be between or amongst the people rather than states over issues related to economic, social, and material deprivation which germinated into culture, ethnicity or religion implications. To sight some brief historic instances, from 1915 to 1916, in the midst of World War I, the new governing regime in Turkey massacred some 1.5 million Armenians who had been living within that country's borders. Some 30 years later, as Britain relinquished power over India, it divided that "jewel in the imperial crown, into two nations, largely Hindu India and Muslim Pakistan. The religious communities in each

country then turned on each other savagely, with a resulting death toll of perhaps one million.

More recently, Hutu villagers in the African nation of Rwanda massacred some half-million of their Tutsi countrymen in 1994 while the world spearheaded by the United States sat and did nothing. Also, in the former country of Yugoslavia, Serbian militias initiated “ethnic cleansing” of their Muslim and Croat neighbors, killing and raping untold thousands more. During the twentieth century, violent confrontations, civil wars, and genocidal activity were frequently motivated by religious conflict (India, Northern Ireland Lebanon), tribal animosities (Nigeria, Rwanda), racial hatred (South Africa), and other forms of ethnic animosities. Continuing ethnic tensions in Macedonia, Kashmir (India), and the Congo in the early years of the twenty-first century seem to confirm Mahabun ul Haq’s prediction in the quotation above, that wars between “peoples”—ethnic, religious, and cultural groups—will continue wars between nation-states.

To be sure, many political analysts since the time of Karl Marx (1818-1883

Have insisted on the primacy of class as the basis for political conflict in both

Industrialized and developing nations. But significant as class conflict has been,

No cleavage has more sharply, and oftentimes violently, divided nations in

Modern times than has ethnicity. “Cultural pluralism [i.e., ethnic diversity” argues Crawford Young is a quintessentially modern phenomenon.” argues Crawford Young “is a quintessentially modern phenomenon.” It has been closely linked to the growth of the middle class and the emergence of politicians who articulated nationalist or other ethnic aspirations while mobilizing workers and peasants behind that ideal.’ Of course, ethnic minorities have been victimized by violence for hundreds of years. One needs only look to the nineteenth-century frontier wars between White settlers and Native Americans in the United States, South Africa, the Liberian foundation, and Chile to identify just few examples. And contrary to common perception, the level of ethnic protests and rebellions within states has actually diminished somewhat since the start of the 1990s, after rising steadily for the previous 50 years. Alarmist warnings notwithstanding, the world has not been crumbling into a maze of small ethnically based states. Still, as we begin a new century, the level of ethnically based internal conflict is still far higher than in the decades prior to the 1990s, in marked contrast to the dramatic decline in wars between nations during that period. Indeed, over the past 50 years, the most frequent arenas for violent conflict have not been wars between sovereign states, but rather internal strife tied to cultural, tribal, religious, or other ethnic animosities. Any listing of the world’s most brutal wars in the past few decades would include ethnically based internal confrontations in Liberia, Somalia, Sierra Leone, Bosnia, Kosovo (Serbia), Rwanda, Congo, Ethiopia, Sudan, Lebanon, and Indonesia (East Timor) , Haiti, Nigeria, The Ivory Coast, among other . At least 15 to 20 million people have died in ethnic violence since World War II. Most recently, the collapse of Soviet and Eastern European communism has released a torrent of pent-up ethnic hatreds in Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, Chechnya, the former Yugoslavia, and other parts of Central and Eastern Europe. Particularly since the end of the Cold War, the world’s attention has focused increasingly on ethnic clashes.

Warfare between Serbs, Croats, Bosnian Muslims, and Kosovo's in the former Yugoslavia, separatist movements among French-speaking Quebecois, racially based riots in Los Angeles, Basque terrorism in Spain, and Protestant-Catholic clashes in Northern Ireland all clearly demonstrate that interethnic friction and violence can erupt in Western democracies as well as in former communist countries to reflect on their Third World allies. But ethnic conflict has been particularly widespread and cruel in Africa, Asia, and other parts of the Third World—in part because countries in those regions tend to have more ethnically diverse populations, and in part because their political systems are generally less capable of peacefully resolving tensions. A recent study determined that there are some 275 “minorities at risk” throughout the world (ethnic groups facing actual or potential repression), with a total population of slightly more than one billion (about one-sixth of the world's populations) scattered in 116 countries. Approximately 85 percent of those at risk live in the Less Developed Countries (LDC) While Asia has the highest absolute population of ethnic minorities, Sub-Saharan Africa has the highest proportion of its population at risk (some 36 percent), followed by North Africa and the Middle East (26 percent). All of the factors identified as key to the success of economic reform in the recent literature are, in fact, dependent on effective political leadership. These include the government's level of understanding of economic issues, its commitment to reform, the insulation of key technocrats, and its ability to build coalitions on behalf of reform. These are some of the modern aspects that must be highest point of visionary Liberian leadership during post 2005 Presidential Leadership.

#### How can Post-Conflict Liberian Presidential "Visionary" Leadership accelerate Democratic growth in Post 2005 Liberia?

A recent paper by senior officials of the International Monetary Fund provides a familiar catalog of policy improvements needed to accelerate growth in a typical African economy. In "Africa: Is This the Turning Point?" Fischer, Hernández-Catá and Khan (FHK 1998) give as first priority raising the rate of private investment. To achieve this, and thereby raise productivity and growth, they list eight conditions. In the course of structural adjustment programs supported by the IMF and the donor community, most African countries have registered progress in fulfilling each of the conditions. However, the threshold of sustained growth has not yet been crossed, and in most countries, more remains to be done on each point. The eight conditions are relegated to post conflict Presidential Liberian Visionary Leadership policy and guidelines that must be the road map:

- Maintaining a stable democratic , political, social, safety and security, health and safety, women empowerment, and an enabling macroeconomic environment;
- "Far-reaching improvements in governance to avoid capricious interference with private activity and to develop and maintain a transparent and stable legal and regulatory environment", thereby reducing investors' risks;
- Trade liberalization;
- Privatization;
- Civil service reform;
- Banking reform;

- Liberalization of the agricultural sector; and
- Improving labor market flexibility and competitiveness.

FHK nowhere refer explicitly to quality of leadership—perhaps this is too much to expect of an institution that has to tread a fine line between advocacy and diplomacy. However, we find the quality of leadership to be implicit in FHK’s reference to improved governance, and in a separate statement that sustaining the recent rise in Africa’s growth "depends on whether policymakers take above the requisite actions." The authors are staunch members of the school advocating—I claim no originality here—that no African economy can accelerate and sustain growth without following some variant of the Asian model that accelerated growth in the agricultural sector while reorienting activity towards the global economy and initiating export of labor-intensive manufactures. On the other hand, I do not belong to the *laissez-faire* branch of this school (if indeed it still exists), which used to be paraphrased as saying, "get the prices right and investment and exports will follow." On the contrary, I accept the lessons of countries such as Korea, Malaysia and Singapore that strategic intervention by the national leadership can engage and energize domestic entrepreneurial talent, increase an economy’s attractiveness to foreign investors, and help make entry into export markets profitable. If Liberia emulates the above development in post conflict 2005 Presidential Leadership visionary, Liberia will once again be placed on the global map of modernization of Africa democracy and women empowerment.

*Towards a clearly defined, Manageable Policy Agenda for Post Conflict 2005 Visionary Liberian Presidential Political Leadership*

Undoubtedly most African chief executives are aware of East Asian role models and would be delighted if history were to credit them with inaugurating their country’s path to industrialization. However, they perceive such a plethora of hurdles, both domestic and foreign—the latter including ‘dumping’ by Asian competitors, as well as industrial country import quotas—that they don’t know where to start, and end up doing little beyond paying lip service to the need to industrialize and export. What do we suggest a "visionary" Liberian leader might do to promote policies that will accelerate his/her country’s growth? In the first place, he/she has to eschew the personal rent-seeking that is now ubiquitous. He/she has to recognize that the example set by a corrupt chief executive permeates all branches and layers of government, from top to bottom in the executive, legislature and judiciary, and undermines growth by engendering “capricious interference” with private activity. Documented examples from Africa are too numerous to cite. Deleterious rent-seeking in Africa is not limited to raiding the treasury or central bank or shaking down contractors. Taking control of the estates being vacated by colonial owners, founder-president Hastings Kamuzu Banda and his associates in Malawi’s political elite lost interest in an agricultural policy oriented towards the rural masses.

In suggesting restraint, I am are not trying to impose the Spartan (and unattainable) condition that a chief executive or minister limit his/her compensation to the nominal salary that most African politicians feel can safely be listed in a published budget. Obviously, additional compensation in cash and kind will be channeled through

nominally unrelated appropriations. It is when a leader draws rents exceeding a reasonable estimate of the opportunity cost of his/her time and effort that the title "visionary" becomes inappropriate. Unfortunately the converse to this rule does not hold—that is, the perceived honesty of a chief executive is no guarantee against a society being permeated with corruption like Liberia. The leading case is Nyerere, who showed that imposition of an ideology tantamount to states can institutionalize rent-seeking in a country that gained independence with a fair chance of keeping it in check. Secondly, the leader has to perceive the need for his/her country eventually to comply with the eight conditions cited by FHK. As they admit, this is a long agenda, and in the short run no African country will satisfy most of the policy conditions of today's NICs. Moreover, as regards the governance condition, not all the countries qualifying as NICs represent attractive models, even if expansion of the middle class, concomitant with rapid growth, has spurred institutional development and government accountability in several Asian and Latin American countries.

Some readers will accuse me of the narrow-minded view that "visionary" leadership in Africa is tantamount to adherence to IMF, World Bank and other donor conditional ties. My answer: let these readers point to any low-income country that has sustained rapid growth of per capita GDP without making significant progress on most of FHK's eight conditions, or where fulfillment of some other condition (apart from the obvious restoration of law and order) has proven to be more important than those on the list. Furthermore, there is no need to adjust within the explicit framework of an IMF/Bank program. Indeed, resultant growth is likely to be faster and less subject to interruption if a government has the discipline to promote adjustment without Bretton Woods support. While trying to foster institutional checks and balances that will eventually reduce opportunities for large-scale plunder, in the short run a visionary African leader can accomplish much by getting a few things right—a realistic exchange rate, moderate inflation, minimal levies on agriculture—and then focusing on a handful of activities that will respond quickly to his/her intervention. So the question is: what are these activities, and what concrete steps by the leader will have a growth impact in the short run? Our answer was anticipated by the preceding country anecdotes. The first priority is to get started on labor-intensive manufactured exports. Here a "visionary" leader can and will pull the available levers in the bureaucracy and civil society to counter "capricious interference", convince foreign and domestic investors of the priority that he/she attaches to promoting exports, and satisfy them that his/her country offers a profitable environment in which to produce and sell. Since a single act of support will rarely suffice, the leader must monitor the situation and be prepared to sustain his/her intervention as long as necessary to create a stable and secure environment for investment.

#### *A Precautionary Introspection: A. Post Civil Conflict Dynamic:*

I do not infer that to be interpreted as saying that, to qualify as "visionary", post conflict Liberian leadership or chief executive must busy him- or herself pursuing every instance where a businessman (or woman) calls the president's office to complain about a brush with the bureaucracy. In the excitement of early days in office, some leaders have tried to

do this, and there are no cases where a sustained increase in political democracy, industrial and economic investment, output and exports can be attributed to such behavior. Indeed the effect can be per versed if the leader develops personal attachments and dislikes that bias government's posture. At the same time, his/her attention is diverted from weightier issues of political and macroeconomic stability. What an I saying is that a post conflict 2005 "visionary" Liberian leader will identify transactions that are strategic from the viewpoint of establishing an enabling environment for agricultural expansion and manufactured exports? He or she will ensure that he or she is informed speedily of blockages, and will intervene rapidly and firmly to overcome them. This in turn presupposes establishment and support of a modest organization that will monitor strategic areas, alert the leader to problems, help design corrective measures, and follow up on their implementation. Such a structure might be as modest as an export facilitation task force, proactive dispute management task force, governmental Corruption Task Force, Work Force Discretionary Task Force, Women Empowerment Task Force, Police and Government Law Enforcement Agency Brutality Task Force, and Equality Employment Task Force.

#### Road Maps and Preconditions for Emergence of new "Visionary" Liberian Leaders

If the quality of top leadership has been a serious impediment to policy reform and accelerated growth in Liberia, what are the chances of significant improvement in the foreseeable future? Strong, Post 2005 Political Visionary Leaders do not emerge like Venus from the sea, in Liberia, Africa, or anywhere else. All leaders, from "visionary" types down to the most venal plutocrats, are products of social structures, i.e. organizations and networks. What needs to be done so that Liberia's social structures will identify and promote leaders who will entrench reforms and accelerate the growth human resources development growth? As economists we challenge our social science colleagues—sociologists, anthropologists, political scientists—to help answer this question. The literature on blacologically perspective of leadership is rich. (See Black/African Spirituality, a prospective book on the Black Bible by Dr. Sirleaf 2005.) Most conceivable scenarios have been thoroughly explored in the special collections of the Black/African Bible. The difficulty has arisen in translating the analysis into practice as yet. However, there is a future prospect for amelioration. Several of Blacologically thinkers have consented to the perpetual situations in which political, social, cultural, economic mismanagement and predation by corrupt Eurological African national leaders have stimulated the formation of broad coalitions that have risen up in frustration and outrage to the end results that eradicate by throwing those rascals out" will be absolutely essential. For instance, Ghana in the late 1970s, Zambia in 1990, Madagascar in 1991. Liberia in the 1990s and 2003). But in many countries, specifically Liberia, such uprisings were e long overdue. Nigeria is a dynamic society, yet had not Gen. Abacha succumbed to a heart attack, one wonders how long it would have taken his suffering people to overthrow him. The recent events in Niger show that leaders can be overthrown. Whether this will improve leadership or simply provoke another round of violence is yet to be determined. Historically, most of the successful popular coalitions have been too short-lived to create a power base for "visionary" individuals. Post Conflict

2005 Visionary Liberian Leadership will be the 21<sup>st</sup> century model for sustainable democracy of post-dictatorial regimes (1980-2003).

*How (if at all) can Outsiders contribute to Visionary Post 2005 Liberian Presidential Political Leadership?)*

This is a difficult question. Overt encouragement, by outsiders, of leaders identified as "visionary" exposes them to attack by xenophobes and/or anti-reform interests, and risks lessening any chance they might have had to affect policy. *In cases of corrupt, non-"visionary" leadership like the Liberian Transitional Leadership, (a) withholding support awaiting a transparency as the first rule is, obviously, (b) and to refrain from encouraging leaders who epitomize anti-growth policies and behavior.*<sup>1</sup> A recent World Bank study of 56 aid-receiving countries in five developing regions (Burnside and Dollar (BD), 1997) found that, over the period 1970-93, donors' strategic interests significantly influenced the allocation of aid, biasing flows in the direction of client countries irrespective of the quality of their economic policies. Moreover, the aid enhanced the longevity of these countries' leaders, and long-term incumbents were resistant to economic reform. The role of leaders with military backgrounds, demonstrated by the above scenario, has certainly been enhanced by the provision of military aid. Indeed, any fungible component of aid has likely led, if only indirectly, to increasing the resources at the military's disposal in order to seize and retain power. Another BD finding is that, in countries with poor policies, aid has not accelerated economic growth, whereas in low-income countries with good policies, aid has increased the per capita GDP growth rate by roughly one-third. Africa accounts for 21 of BD's 56 countries, and half their subset of 40 low-income countries. The measure of donor interests is crude, assigning dummy variables to four countries/country groups, namely (1) Sub-Saharan Africa as a whole, perceived as a focus of European strategic interest, (2) the franc zone (French interest), and two objects of US interest, namely (3) Central America and (4) Egypt. The dummy variable for Africa turns out to be insignificant.

A more disaggregated study valuing donor strategic interests in Africa country-by-country would likely find the relevant variable significant. The cold war helped leaders such as Kaunda, Mobutu, Moi, Mugabe, Samuel K.Doe of Liberia, and Siad Barre to attract a disproportionate share of aid, notwithstanding poor policy regimes, and strengthen their hold on power by playing geopolitics. Even if the greatest of the African kleptocrats, Mobutu, is no longer around, there are still many lesser Mobutus. To be sure, with too few viable alternatives as yet emerging from indigenous social structures, donors cannot avoid asking themselves: if we withhold support from kleptocrat X, what is the likelihood of his or her being replaced by leadership of even lower quality, or by a situation of quasi-anarchy with virtually no leadership at all (. Sierra Leone).

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Cognizant of Supplementation of) pro-active political opposition

Out of diplomatic nicety, the Bretton Woods institutions, one quarter of whose members are African governments, have been reluctant to threaten the positions of corrupt national leaders by publicizing evidence of corruption to which their staffs have access, and imposing related conditional ties. The non-government organization Transparency International (TI), currently the main international voice against macro corruption in low-income countries, was established by ex-World Bank officials frustrated by the obstacles that staff lawyers posed to an active Bank posture in this area. The World Bank and IMF have recently been somewhat more forthcoming. Examples, featuring collaboration with once equally timid bilateral donors, include the ultimatum over Zambian cabinet ministers, and insistence on legal action by Kenya against the Goldenberg perpetrators. In our view, donor support of TI and similar private initiatives could and should be carried further. The ending of the cold war has freed up intelligence assets that could help uncover and expose the best hidden and yet most important class of data, namely, transfer of bribery proceeds to numbered bank accounts and illicit acquisition of other foreign assets.

Helping Post Conflict 2005 Visionary Liberian Political Leaders Implement Political, Social, Economic, and Cultural Modernization and Democratic Reforms

The relevance of this research on this particular section strongly depends on the BD's study (Burnside and Banks) on the extent to which an African country's pursuit of good policies overlaps with "visionary" leadership. BD's policy index has three components that this study wishes to embrace:

1. The Sachs-Warner dummy variable for *trade openness*, where an "open" economy's average tariffs on machinery and materials are 40% or less, the black market exchange rate premium does not exceed 20%, and pervasive government control of key tradable is absent;
2. The level of inflation is a proxy for *monetary policy*; and
3. Quality of *fiscal policy* is measured by the budget surplus and government consumption, both relative to GDP ("good" policy is defined as one

standard deviation away from the sample mean—towards a positive surplus and lower government consumption).

<sup>2</sup>A World Bank paper (WB 1998c) serving as background to BD (1997) uses the term "sound economic management" interchangeably with "good policies". "Management" has a greater connotation of "leadership" than does "policy". In a society with strong institutions and a broad consensus regarding economic policy, "visionary" leadership by a president (or other senior official or small group of officials delegated by the chief executive) is less vital for achieving respectable economic performance. One needs look only as far as the US—not all recent presidents could be characterized as "visionary" leaders. On the other hand, African countries are not yet characterized by strong national institutions and broad policy consensus. Hence "visionary" leadership by a single individual with political power, or a small coterie to whom he/she delegates power, is critical to institutional development as well as to adopting and sustaining policies that will accelerate an African country's economic growth. So we return to the question: how best can outsiders encourage such leadership? <sup>3</sup>One way is to help the leader formulate and implement his/her policies, once he/she has assumed power. WB (1998b) summarizes the record here. Donors have long provided aid subject to policy conditional ties—structural adjustment lending (and grants) that started around 1980 embodies this approach. Sachs (1994) cites eight countries (none of them in Africa, to be sure) where aid was a critical input in the reform process, helping "good governments to survive long enough to solve problems." By contrast, Rodrik (1996) argues that just as many cases can be cited of countries where aid enabled governments to delay reforms that impending economic collapse would otherwise have forced on them.

This divergence in country experiences poses an interesting dichotomy in regard to the connection between aid giving and "visionary" leadership in Africa. On the one hand, a case can be made for awarding the title of "most visionary leader of all" to one who believes traditional public foreign aid has impeded his/her country's development by creating a dependency relationship detrimental to adoption of pro-growth policies, as well as to mobilization of domestic talent and resources. Such a leader will be more inclined to devise an aid/debt "exit" strategy than to persuade donors to augment the aid flow.

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<sup>2</sup> **A World Bank paper (WB 1998c) serving as background to BD (1997) uses the term "sound economic management" interchangeably with "good policies". "Management" has a greater connotation of "leadership" than does "policy". In a society with strong institutions and a broad consensus regarding economic policy, "visionary" leadership by a president (or other senior official or small group of officials delegated by the chief executive) is less vital for achieving respectable economic performance**

<sup>3</sup> <sup>3</sup>One way is to help the leader formulate and implement his/her policies, once he/she has assumed power. WB (1998b) summarizes the record here. Donors have long provided aid subject to policy conditional ties—structural adjustment lending (and grants) that started around 1980 embodies this approach. Sachs (1994) cites eight countries (none of them in Africa, to be sure) where aid was a critical input in the reform process, helping "good governments to survive long enough to solve problems." By contrast, Rodrik (1996) argues that just as many cases can be cited of countries where aid enabled governments to delay reforms that impending economic collapse would otherwise have forced on them.

This divergence in country experiences poses an into

He/she will be more interested in foreign direct investment than official development assistance (ODA). In the event such leaders appear in Africa, the outside world can be most supportive by helping design the strategy and arranging the resource flows needed to provide breathing space. Above and beyond this, outsiders can engage in dialogue with the majority of leaders regarding the merits of adopting and pursuing an aid/debt exit strategy. At the same time, we do not begrudge the title of "visionary" to a leader who believes the selective and efficient use of ODA can accelerate a healthy growth process by underwriting a larger human and physical capital stock than could otherwise be supported. Such a leader will devise and pursue a strategy to attract aid, which includes, among other things, pursuing reforms consistent with broad donor conditional ties. Another requirement for making outside support for reform effective is to phase disbursements under an aid instrument—notably the quick-disbursing variety comprising budget or balance of payments support—such that fulfillment of conditional ties can be assessed frequently and disbursements withheld if reforms are not implemented adequately. This has two advantages: firstly, it strengthens the hand of reform-minded leaders in implementing reforms over local opposition, secondly, it saves the donor money if it turns out the country leaders are not serious about reform. Sachs (1994) also argues, again from non-African examples, that reform programs that succeeded in accelerating growth, whether or not supported by aid, have generated political momentum prolonging the lives of several "good" governments. Moreover, in institutional environments stronger than those found in most of Africa, success has imparted irreversibility to reform, so that formerly anti-reform leaders have ended up sustaining the reforms once they came to power. Thus, insofar as aid contributed to reform's success, it has helped make "visionary" leaders out of politicians formerly beholden to anti-reform interest groups.

### *Helping "Visionary" Liberian leaders to Gain Democratic power*

Can outsiders increase the chances of "visionary" Political leaders taking power in the first place? In theory, if donors withhold aid from the corrupt, non-"visionary" leaders so prevalent in Africa today, the resulting disruption to the economy makes it more difficult for such individuals to remain in power, whether they are voted out in a system that permits relatively free elections, or forced out in a *coup d'état* or popular uprising. In practice, things often do not work out this way; witness the many disappointing leaders who manage to hang on to power notwithstanding persistent economic crisis—even, in Kenya and Zambia, following restoration of multi-party electoral competition under donor pressure, and specifically in Zambia's case, despite the removal of the failed chief executive. Arriving at a perception that "visionary" opposition leaders are likely to attract greater aid and thereby, as well as in other ways, improve economic performance, a well-informed public should award those leaders more votes, or take greater risks to support them in an uprising. But not many electorates in Africa (or in most other developing countries, for that matter) can yet be described as well informed in the sense of anticipating the eventual gains from liberalization and other components of economic reform. Moreover, after years of sustained economic failure, most African populations are risk-averse, as is evident in the variety of "coping" strategies widely used to raise the prospects of economic survival. WB (1998b) gives four rules of thumb for effective

donor intervention "under difficult conditions", apart from (and sometimes as a substitute for) financial transfers. All of these imply support for "visionary" leaders, short of holding a press conference where a panel of donor representatives calls on Country A's public to replace the current leadership with individuals X, Y and Z.

1. <sup>4</sup>"*Find a champion...*there are likely to be reform-minded elements in the community and even in the government. If aid can find and support these reformers, it can have a big impact."
2. "*Have a long-term vision of systemic change.*"
3. "*Support knowledge creation...* Reformers often need to develop the details of reform through innovation and evaluation... For reform to take root requires a demonstration that it works." Aid should finance and evaluate innovations.
4. "*Engage civil society.* In highly distorted environments the government is failing to provide supportive policies and effective services... Support civil society to pressure the government to change or to take service provision directly into its own hands..."

Once more out of diplomatic nicety, the World Bank is excluded from publishing names and other particulars of situations in which the Bank and other donors have applied such measures and thereby succeeded in dislodging corrupt, non-"visionary" leaders. Suffice it to refer back to our earlier Table 1, which suggests that progress has been slow. Moreover, included in the table are a number of one-time opposition leaders who switched once they took power. Like aid, honesty, integrity and commitment are fungible. Fomenting change is an imprecise and precarious activity.

*The Long Run—Human Capital Formation and Democratic Institution Capacity Building in Liberia, will curtail the Obnoxious use of the First Amendment Rights, Future and Anticipated Military Coupe, and Political Up Rising.*

It is an article of faith in the development community that increased investment in education will generate a more enlightened electorate and strengthen a country's institutions of governance, along with the capacity of its socio-political structures to produce strong, "visionary" leaders. This notwithstanding the fact that estimates of the

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internal rate of return of educational expenditure in Africa, based on differential earnings during graduates' working lives, have tended to decline over time. Thus, to the extent donors invest in education in Africa, they are incidentally helping to build leadership capacity in the long run. Some observers, including many associated with United Nations agencies other than the Bretton Woods institutions, argue that education has suffered under donor-funded structural adjustment programs obliging governments to curtail budget deficits. This is contradicted by a recent IMF study, which reports that African countries participating in ESAF and HIPC programs recorded an average 1.0 percent per annum increase in real per capita education spending since the year preceding the respective programs, during the period 1986-97. Education indicators also improved modestly in African program countries, illiteracy declining by 2.8 percent per annum, gross primary school enrollment rising by 0.1 percent per annum and secondary enrollment by 0.6 percent per annum.

Whatever the weight of the evidence, the authors are convinced that the majority of African governments undertaking structural adjustment would soon have found themselves with less real resources to use in all sectors, including education, had they failed to deal with fiscal and international payments imbalances.

## V. Conclusion

The main issue addressed in this paper is whether the quality of national leadership is relevant to evaluating the progress of African countries towards sustained economic growth. We inquire whether it is conceivable (i) that "visionary" leaders, comparable to individuals who helped launch economic growth in other regions, could have appeared in Africa in the past, have appeared recently, or may be expected to appear in the foreseeable future, even if only randomly and in very small numbers. And (ii), once having appeared, whether they could have made pro-growth policies difficult to reverse (or will do so in future), giving domestic and foreign investors the necessary confidence to expand productive capacity, create jobs, produce competitively and export.

If not, then analysis of leadership as a distinct factor cannot contribute to understanding and prediction about Africa's growth prospects. Instead, we should stick to interest-group analysis, asking in what circumstances "gainers" from liberalization and policy reform more generally will acquire the political power necessary to institutionalize those processes. Few, if any social phenomena are adequately explained by a single hypothesis. So also the policy failings underlying Africa's poor economic performance are fully explained neither by the shortcomings of leadership alone, nor solely by interest group dynamics. In a society with fragile institutions and unstable coalitions of interests, a strong, visionary leader has the potential to mold the coalitions in order to implement policies that, in promoting growth, will maximize any reasonable social welfare function. *Ceteris paribus*, the greater the power and stability of the interest groups anticipating harm from market-oriented reforms, the harder it is for the leader to assert him or herself. Conversely, the stronger and more visionary the leader, the better he/she will be able to manipulate and compensate the groups, while nurturing budding interest groups that anticipate net benefits from the reforms. Our research leads us to believe that large

number; possibly most African countries have been ruled by leaders who had sufficient power to implement reforms had they been motivated to do so. However, their motivation led them in different directions. As a result, policy reforms have been implemented haltingly, with frequent reversals. In a sense, this outcome represents the triumph of groups "interested only in aggrandizement and the appeasement of their hangers-on— family members, friends, and associates whose political support is bought by sharing the loot.

To the extent that this is true, it follows that:

- Shortcomings of Post Conflict Presidential Leadership in Economic Policy represents a highly relevant issue in Liberia;
- The relative dearth of pro-growth and emulation of progressive past Liberian Leaders has been and continues to be extremely costly to the expressed populations of Liberia and most African countries;
- This dearth is an issue meriting research that goes beyond traditional Liberian interest-group analysis.

The key question that this study finds which, of course, demands further research: Is there anything specific to the current Liberian socio-political environment that retards the emergence of UN corrupts Liberian Political Leaders with qualities such as those identified with Harberger's "heroes" or others cited in the literature review of this study?

The finding of this study has argued that outsiders, notably donors, exercise variable influence over the settings that nurture "visionary" Liberian Leaders. So far, this influence has proven to be asymmetrical, in the sense that donors have contributed much more to helping corrupt, non-"visionary" Liberian Leaders hold on to power, than they have contributed to nurturing "visionary" pro-growth Liberian Leaders like the late President William Richard Tolbert. As long as the World Bank's concept of "a long-term vision of systemic change" can be interpreted to encompass preparation of an aid/debt exit strategy, I believe the IMF, The World Bank's rules of thumb for effective donor intervention or any outsider's developmental initiatives in support of growth policy can do double duty as guidelines for outside nurturing of "Visionary" Leaders in Liberia in particular and Africa in general. Nevertheless, experience of euphoric jubilations cautions against Post Civil Conflict and Post Presidential Leadership optimism in Liberia that the guidelines will yield quick results. In addition to nurturing from outside, one must hope that Post Conflict Liberia's evolving social structures—organizations and networks—will provide opportunities for more Visionary exiles Liberians, individuals, and friends of Liberia with are able and conscious to return to Liberia with the power to assert them over incumbent Local Democratic Leadership for empowerment. It may also not be amiss to hope that outright luck will favor the random appearance of a few more strong, determined, and nationalistic "visionary" young and old Liberian leaders than have recently graced the landscape.

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